1、MiG23MLDComparisonsNew1MiG-23MLD vs Western Fighters the Soviet Air Force ViewAlexander Mladenov looks at the former Soviet Air Force concepts, dating from the mid-1980s, for the MiG-23MLDs employment in the air superiority role pitted against the F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 Although this articl
2、e can be regarded as being of somewhat historical value, in fact it still has a certain practical value for the present day. In Russia, the other CIS republics and Eastern Europe the aging Flogger was retired from service completely between 1997 and 2002, but in the Third World countries, considered
3、 hostile to the West, the type is regarded yet as mature and capable enough design, performing useful work in the air-to-air role, with perhaps better mission capable rates than the early-series MiG-29s operated by those nations. As many as 30 fighter Floggers are believed to be maintained in combat
4、-ready state by the Iraqi Air Force; no less than 60 more are in service with the Syrian air arm (including more than 40 highly-modified MiG-23MLDs); the Cuban Air Force has on strength slightly less than three dozens MiG-23MF/MLAs; and more than 40 Flogger-Gs continue to soldier on with the North K
5、orean Air Force. Some of the countries on the rogue list have determined and skilled Flogger pilots and to underestimate them and their mounts would be foolish, and, in case of war, potentially dangerous. The Bekaa Valley Defeat a Stimulus for Further Flogger Upgrades In June 1982, the Soviet-style
6、air superiority/air defence rather orthodox doctrine, training and tactics have proved to be fully inadequate and ineffective when employed against the Israeli Defence Force/Air Force (IDF/AF). Syrian losses fighters, fighter-bombers and helicopters between June 6 and 11 - numbered some 85 (between
7、82 and 92 according to some sources) while Syrians claimed for some 27 IDF/AF fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft shoot down which is obviously a bogus. It is well known that Israelis deny losing any aircraft in air combats during the 1982 Lebanon war though such statements may also be considered, to so
8、me extent, as dubious. According to the authoritative research article Early MiG-23s in Operational Service, written by the 1960s-1980s local conflicts researcher Tom Cooper (published in Air Enthusiast, Vol 100, July-August 2002, p56-67), the Syrian fighter Floggers played only a secondary role in
9、the conflict. Confirmed losses during the clashes over the Bekaa Valley between June 9 and 11 comprised four MiG-23MS and six MiG-23MFs, while their pilots claimed at least five enemy aircraft shoot though most if not all of these kills cannot be confirmed by independent sources and thus could be re
10、garded more as bogus rather than of realistic reports. MiG-23MLDs pros and cons the Soviet view of the 1980sThe most significant post-Bekaa Valley undertaking of the Soviet Air Force was the crash-programme upgrade of the huge VVS-FA MiG-23ML/MLA Flogger-G fleet to the MiG-23MLD Flogger-K standard,
11、also known as Izdelye 23-18 in the internal designation system of the MiG Design Bureau. In the early 1980s, the MiG-23 made up the backbone of the VVS (Voenno-Vazdushni Sili - the Soviet Air Force) Frontal Aviation (FA) air defence/air superiority assets. No less than 1,100 MiG-23M/ML/MLAs were in
12、service with the Soviet front-line combat units by that time and more than 600 of them used to equip at least 15 fighter regiments based in Central Europe that were considered to be the spearhead of the Soviet air superiority assets at the most probable theatre of operations during the Cold War era.
13、 The Flogger-Ks upgrade package is known to had been prepared even before the Lebanon war and a total of 560 VVS MiG-23ML/MLAs were upgraded while only 66 improved interceptors (with only new avionics) are reported by Russian sources as being newly-built between mid/late 1982 and December 1984; thes
14、e are known as the MiG-23MLD(Export) (Izdelie 23-19 or the alternative designation Izdelie 23-22) and were only exported to Syria and Bulgaria 50 and 16 examples respectively. Interestingly, the NATO reporting name Flogger-G was retained, as these aircraft were hardly distinguishable from the basic
15、MiG-23ML/MLA. Unlike its export counterparts, the VVS-FA MiG-23MLDs boasted much-improved maneuvering performance thanks to a host of airframe and flight control system upgrades.It would be interesting for the Western public to examine and analyse in details the content of a Soviet Air Force supplem
16、entary air combat manual. This particular 32-page manual titled Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 was published not long after the Bekaa Valley clashes. By that time both the Soviet and client states pilots still trained mainly in the orthodox - and o
17、ften described as inflexible - air intercept tactics, derived from the 1960s and mastered to perfection during the MiG-21 era. Traditionally, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet and client air arms flew the MiG-23M/ML/MLD like the MiG-21 as a high-speed point interceptor closely guided and supp
18、orted by the GCI, and it took no less than 12 years to employ the Flogger-G/K as a true air superiority fighter.Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 refers to the MiG-23MLD(Export) version, powered by the R35-300 turbojet, rated at 28,700 lbs (127kN or 1
19、3,000kg) in full afterburner, without the aerodynamics and flight control system improvements of the VVS-FA MIG-23MLDs. According to the manual, the aircrafts main parameters defining the energy maneuverability performance turn out the fighter slightly better than the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom
20、II and definitely better than the IAI Kfir C.2. However, the MiG-23MLDs air combat performance aspects, as given in the manual, are quoted as definitely inferior to those of the McDonnell Douglas F-15A and General Dynamics F-16A. There are only few areas within the MiG-23MLDs envelope where it could
21、 boast equal or slightly better performance aspects when pitted against the third generation US fighters. For example, the manuals authors claim that compared than the F-4E (not specified whether the slated or non-slated sub-version of the Phantom is concerned), the MiG-23MLD has superior sustained
22、turn performance throughout the entire envelope, excluding the range between 377 and 540kts (700 and 1,000km/h) bellow 21,000ft (7,000m) as well as an edge over the Phantom II in the zoom climb performance at all altitudes and speeds, excluding the true airspeed range between 485 and 647kts (900 and
23、 1,200km/h) above 18,000ft (6,000m). Pitted against the F-15A, the MiG-23MLD has the only notable advantage in the zoom climb performance at speeds above 620kts (1,150km/h) while pitted against the F-16A, the manual asserts that the Soviet swing-wing fighter boasts somewhat better sustained turn per
24、formance above 15,000ft (5,000m) at speeds close to the maximum as well as better zoom climb performance at true airspeeds exceeding 590kts (1,100km/h). However, as real-world tests have shown in Israel where the defected in November 1989 MiG-23MLD (Export) was flight-tested by the IDF/AF, the swing
25、-wing fighter demonstrated - somewhat surprisingly - better acceleration than the escorting F-16s and this tends to indicate that in real world conditions the MiG-23MLD would have a slight edge over the early F-16s in acceleration and energy maneuverability, at true airspeeds above 485kts (900km/h).
26、 The IAI Kfir C.2, as assessed in the manual, is said to be inferior to the MiG-23MLD by sustained turn performance at airspeeds above 540kts (1,000km/h), by zoom climb performance at true airspeeds bellow 540 kts (1,000km/h), while at altitudes bellow 12,000ft (4,0000m) the MiG-23MLD has an edge in
27、 energy maneuverability throughout the entire speed range.Sensor and Self-Protection ConsiderationsAccording to the manual, the MiG-23MLDs N008E Sapfir-23MLAE-2 pulse radar has superior performance than the Phantoms APQ-120, approximately equal performance compared to the F-16As AN/APG-66 and defini
28、tely inferior performance to the F-15As AN/APG-63. (See Table 2 and Figure 1). The manuals authors claim that airborne radar maximum detection range alone cannot grant any decisive tactical advantage in the non-sterile environment of the real world air combat. It is well known that fighter radar tar
29、get detection and discrimination performance are, in general terms, somehow limited by the relatively low resolution offered by the radar beam with an average width of between 2.5 and 3.5 degrees in azimuth and elevation. In addition, the generally low reliability of the electronic identification (E
30、ID) facilities in the early/mid 1980s is another factor that would prevent the enemy fighters from the full use of their superior Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability. However, the manual notes that the F-16As and F-15As radars have a plethora of valuable close air combat modes with automatic target
31、 acquisition at close ranges (up to 6-10nm 10-18km) with missile seeker heads slaved to the radars line-of-sight for increased accuracy and missile lock-on speed. Both the F-15As and F-16As Pulse-Doppler (PD) radars have well-known problems with their stability of locking-on targets flying bellow th
32、em on the beam (side-on, when in snap-down attacks). This particular shortcoming could be used to a good effect by the MiG-23 pilots to escape from attacks and got away as the evasion from the AIM-7F Sparrow SARH missile, launched by the F-15 could be easily achieved by performing a high-g beam mane
33、uvering. As a rule, while operating in look-down/shoot-down mode over mountainous terrain, the early Spafir-23s performance in the look-down/shoot down mode is notably degraded, but the MLDs Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar has a newly added, highly useful Pulse-Doppler mode (Non-Coherent) with somewhat improved ultra-low level targ
