英文文献翻译主观幸福感Word文件下载.docx
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英文文献翻译主观幸福感Word文件下载.docx
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Inthissection,Iexploretherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterinthewritingsonsubjectivemeasures.Iwillarguethatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingdisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter:
aboutwhethersubjectivewell-beingconstituteswell-beingsimpliciterormerelyisacomponentofit.
Asmystartingpoint,Itaketheconceptofwell-being,thatis,whatIhavesofarcalledwell-beingsimpliciter:
“whatwehavewhenourlivesaregoingwellforus,whenwearelivinglivesthatarenotnecessarilymorallygood,butgoodforus”(Tiberius,2006,p.493,italicsinoriginal).Letuscallthisthe“core”conceptofwell-being.Therearemanyothertermsthatareusedinthesamesense,including“aperson’sgood,benefit,advantage,interest,prudentialvalue,welfare,happiness,flourishing,eudaimonia,andutility”(Moore&
Crisp,1996,p.599).Becausetheconceptofwell-beingisintendedtocapturewhatisultimately–andnotjustinstrumentally–goodfortheindividual,itisalsosupposedtocapturethatwhichwehavereasontopromote–asanendandnotjustasameans–bothinourownlivesandinthelivesofothers.AsThomasScanlonputsit:
Itiscommonlysupposedthatthereisasimplenotionofindividualwell-beingthatplaysthefollowingthreeroles.First,itservesasanimportantbasisforthedecisionsofasinglerationalindividual,atleastforthosedecisionsinwhichheorshealoneisconcerned(thatistosay,inwhichmoralobligationsandconcernsforotherscanbeleftaside).Second,itiswhataconcernedbenefactor,suchasafriendorparent,hasreasontopromote.Third,itisthebasisonwhichanindividual’sinterestsaretakenintoaccountinmoralargument(Scanlon,1998,p.93).3
Inparticular,itisfrequentlyassumedthatwell-beingisoneconsiderationorassomepeoplewouldargue,theonlyconsiderationthatshouldserveasanend,andnotjustameansforpublicpolicy.HereIwilltakeitforgrantedthatwhenproponentsofsubjectivemeasurestalkaboutsuchmeasuresasrepresentingwell-being,theyusetheterminthecoresense(Angner,2009a,inpress).First,asindicatedabove,subjectivemeasuresareoftenpresentedasalternativestoothermeasuresofwelfareorwell-being;
thiswouldmakelittlesenseif,infact,subjectivemeasureswerenotintendedtorepresentthatwhichtheothermeasuresweredesignedtorepresentviz.welfareorwell-being.Second,theproponents’conceptofwell-beingplaystheverysameroleasthatplayedbythecoreconcept:
thosewhodefendtheuseofsubjectivemeasuresofwellbeingoftenemphasizethattheythinkofwell-beingasthatwhichisultimatelygoodfortheindividual,asthatwhichisworthpromotinginthelifeofothers,andasacentral(sometimestheonly)ultimategoalforpublicpolicy(cf.Diener&
Seligman,2004,quotedabove).Third,anumberofproponentsexplicitlyciteclassicalphilosophicalliteratureinenthusiasticagreementwhilesignalingthattheyuse“well-being”and/or“happiness”inthesamesenseasphilosophersdo(Kahneman,Wakker,&
Sarin,1997;
Layard,2005;
Watson,1930).
Overtheyears,philosophershavetriedtoshedlightontheconceptofwell-beingbydevelopinganddefendingvariousaccounts,orconceptionsofwell-being.Here,IfollowParfit(1984,pp.493–502)individingsuchaccountsintothreemainclasses:
mentalstateaccounts,preference-satisfactionordesire-fulfillmentaccounts,andobjective-listaccounts.4Accordingtomental-stateaccounts,well-beingisa“mentalstate”ora“stateofmind.”Becausetheseaccountsallseewelfare“ashavingtoenterourexperience,”theyaresaidtosatisfytheexperiencerequirement(Griffin,1986,p.13).Scanlonwrites:
“Experientialtheoriesholdthatthequalityoflife‘forthepersonwholivesit’iscompletelydeterminedbyitsexperientialquality,”where“experientialquality”refersto“whatitwouldbeliketoliveit”(Scanlon,1998,pp.97,99).Onthisview,then,subjectivelyfeltexperienceisbothnecessaryandsufficientforaperson’swell-being.Accordingtodesire-fulfillmentorpreference-satisfactionaccounts,bycontrast,apersoniswellofftotheextentthatherdesiresarefulfilledand/orherpreferencesaresatisfied.Scanlonputsitthisway:
Desiretheoriesrejecttheexperiencerequirementandallowthataperson’slifecanbemadebetterandworsenotonlybychangesinthatperson’sstatesofconsciousnessbutalsobychangeselsewhereintheworldwhichfulfillthatperson’spreferences(Scanlon,1993,p.186).
Suchaccountsdonotrequirethatapersonwhoiswelloffexperienceanyfeelingsofhappinessorsatisfaction.Whattheydorequireisthatherdesiresarefulfilled(orthatherpreferencesaresatisfied),whichdoesnotcomedowntothesamething.Thetwokindsofaccountdescribedsofararefrequentlyreferredtoassubjectiveaccounts,becausetheydescribeaperson’swell-beingas(atleastpartly)afunctionofhisorherfeelings,experiences,desires,andsoon.Accordingtoso-calledobjectiveaccounts,bycontrast,aperson’swell-beingdoesnotdependonsuchsubjectivefactors.Onsuchaccounts,“certainthingsaregoodorbadforbeings,independentlyinatleastsomecasesofwhethertheyaredesiredorwhethertheygiverisetopleasurableexperiences”(Chappell&
Crisp,1998,p.553).Identifyingthelistofthingsthataregoodforpeopleregardlessofwhattheywantisnotoriouslydifficult,butoneprovisionallistofsuchthingsincludes“moralgoodness,rationalactivity,thedevelopmentofone’sabilities,havingchildrenandbeingagoodparent,knowledge,andtheawarenessoftruebeauty”(Parfit,1984,p.499).Obviously,therearemanyversionsofaccountsofeachkind.
Thetri-partitedivisionpermitsustocaptureamajordifferencebetweensubjectivemeasuresofwell-being,traditionaleconomicwelfaremeasures,andwelfareindicatorsinspiredbythecapabilityapproach.Ithasbeennotedelsewherethattraditionaleconomicwelfaremeasuresarebasedonpreference-satisfactionaccountsofwell-being(Angner,2009a,b,inpress;
Harsanyi,1982;
Hausman&
McPherson,2006).Thisisevident,amongotherthings,fromthefactthatwelfareeconomiststraditionallyhavedefendedtheirmeasuresbyshowingthattheyareutilityfunctions,thatis,thattheyareindicesofpreferencesatisfaction.Ithasalsobeennotedthatmeasuresinspiredbythecapabilityapproacharebasedonobjective-listaccountsofwell-being(Nussbaum,2008;
Sen,1987).Thisisclear,amongotherthings,fromtheassumptionthatcertainthings–inparticular,havingalargecapabilityset–arethoughttobegoodforapersonregardlessofwhetherthosethingswouldmakethepersonhappier,andofwhetherthepersondesiresthem.5
Meanwhile,itisfairlyobviousthatmanyproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresthinkofwell-beingasamentalstate.Thereisabundantevidence,foronething,thattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.Intheliteratureonsubjectivemeasures,well-beingisoftendescribedasamatterexclusivelyofindividualsubjective,hedonic,oraffectiveexperience.Forexample,DavidG.MyersquotesMadamedelaFayetteassaying:
“Ifonethinksthatoneishappy,thatisenoughtobehappy,”andaddsthat“likeMadamedeLaFayette,socialscientistsviewwell-beingasastateofmind.Well-being,sometimescalled‘subjectivewell-being’toemphasizethepoint,isapervasivesensethatlifeisgood”(Myers,1992,pp.23,27).Myersevidentlytakeswell-beingtobesomethingthoroughlysubjective;
note,inparticular,theuseoftheterm“subjectivewell-being”assynonymouswith“well-being.”Theexplicitreferencetostatesofmindstronglysuggeststhatwhathehasinmindissometypeofmental-stateaccount.
Similarly,EdDienerwrites:
“Theareaofsubjectivewell-beingissubjective.[It]resideswithintheexperienceoftheindividual”(Diener,1984,p.543).DienerandEunkookSuhreinforcethepoint:
Subjectivewell-beingresearchisconcernedwithindividuals’subjectiveexperiencesoftheirlives.Theunderlyingassumptionisthatwell-beingcanbedefinedbypeople’sconsciousexperiences—intermsofhedonicfeelingsorcognitivesatisfactions.Thefieldisbuiltonthepresumptionthattounderstandtheindividuals’experientialqualityofwell-being,itisappropriatetodirectlyexaminehowapersonfeelsaboutlifeinthecontextofhisorherownstandards(Diener&
Suh,1997,p.191).
DienerandSuh,likeMyersandtheauthorstowhomherefers,apparentlyusetheterm“well-being”interchangeablywith“subjectivewell-being.”ThefactthatDienerandSuharguethatwell-beingisnotonlyconcernedwiththeindividual’ssubjectiveexperiences,butdefinedbythem,stronglysuggeststhattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.
Severalauthorsemphasizethesubjectivecharacterofwell-being,astheyusetheterm,bycontrastingsubjectivemeasureswith“objective”ones,includingsocialandeconomicindicators.Dienermakesthispointinthefollowingway:
NotablyabsentfromdefinitionsofSWB[subjectivewell-being]arenecessaryobjectiveconditionssuchashealth,comfort,virtue,orwealth.AlthoughsuchconditionsareseenaspotentialinfluencesonSWB,theyarenotseenasaninherentandnecessarypartofit(Diener,1984,p.543).6
Thisquoteconfirmsthat,inDiener’swork,anindividual’swell-beingisdefinednotbytheobjectivecircumstancesinwhichshefindsherself,butbyhersubjectiveexperiences,thoughheallowstheformertobecausallyresponsibleforthelatter.DanielKahneman,whoidentifieswell-beingwithhappiness
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