92Cooperation and trust.docx
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92Cooperation and trust.docx
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92Cooperationandtrust
9.2
Cooperationandtrustasasubstitute
forgovernment
Thenatureofpeopleandofgovernment
Cooperationwithoutgovernment
Reciprocatingbehavior
Socialnormsandtrust
Conclusions
1.Thenatureofpeopleandofgovernment
Intheprevioussectionweconsideredthescopeofgovernmentinthecontextofmultiplegovernment.Weshallnowconsiderthenatureoftherelationbetweenpeopleandgovernment.Thequestionweaskiswhetherasocietyrequiresagovernmentthatexercisesauthorityoverthepeopleoragovernmentoverwhichpeopleexerciseauthority?
OpposinganswerstothisquestionareprovidedinthewritingsofThomasHobbes(1588-1679)andJohnLocke(1632-1704).Thedifferentanswersarebasedondifferentviewsofthenatureofpeople.
Hobbes’caseforimposedorder
Inhisbook“Leviathan”,whichwaspublishedin1651,ThomasHobbesmadeacaseforgovernmentthathasabsoluteauthorityoverallpeople.Hobbesproposedthatmenandwomenarebynaturecruelanddisrespectfultooneanother.Tocontrolthebaseinstinctsofmenandwomen,Hobbescalledforthecontrollinghandofa“leviathan”.
Hobbesdeclaredthat,withouttheorderimposedbytheleviathan,therewouldbeanarchy.Peoplewouldmurderoneanotherforeachother’sproperty.Lifewouldbe“brutish”and“short”,therewouldbenoruleoflawandnoprivatepropertyrights,andallpeoplewouldcontestallthings.
Hobbes’viewofhumanitywasthatallpeoplecouldbecategorizedaseithergreedyorlazy.Heviewedallpeople,regardlessofwhethertheyaregreedyorlazy,asseekingpoweroverotherpeople.Peaceandtranquilityinasocietyonlyarosebecausepeoplefearedtheretaliationofothers.Hobbesviewedpeaceasnotduetogoodwillamongpeople,butastheconsequenceofinvestmentsindefenseandsecuritythatpeoplemaketoprotectthemselvesfromthedesignsofothersontheirpropertyandperson.
Hobbes’absoluterulerorleviathanwouldensureacivilizedsocietybyhavingamonopolyonpoweroverpeople.Theleviathanwouldalsoownallproperty.Thepoweroftheleviathanwouldbepermanentandhereditary,and,sincepowerwasnotcontestable,peoplewouldnotuseresourcesinrent-seekingconteststobecometheleviathan.Theuntrustworthynatureofpeoplemadesurrendertotheleviathan,accordingtoHobbes,theonlyrationalresponseifindividualswishedtoliveinasecurecivilizedsociety.
Hobbeswaswritingcenturiesbeforetheprisoners’dilemmahadbeenformallysetout.Hewashoweverstatingtheideathat,lefttotheirownindependentdecisions,peoplewouldnotcooperateandwouldharmoneanother,whereasvoluntarilyimposedcoerciveauthoritywouldimproveeverybody’slife.
AlthoughHobbeswasjustifyinggovernmentbyabsolutehereditarymonarchy,hispositionalsoapplieswhenpeoplearecalledontobesubserviencetodecisionsmadebymajorityvoting.Justaspeoplewouldbesubjecttotheleviathan,so,undermajorityvoting,thewilloftheminorityissubjugatedtothedecisionsofthemajority.Whetherunderabsoluteauthorityoftheleviathanorunderdemocraticmajorityvoting,individualsarethereforesubjecttotheauthorityofothers.
Locke’scaseforgovernmentthatrespectsnaturalfreedom
Inhisbook“TwoTreatisesofGovernment”,publishedin1690,JohnLockemadethecaseforgovernmentthatisaccountabletothepeople.Lockeproposedthatthenaturalstateofmenandwomenwaspersonalfreedom,andeverypersonwasentitledbynaturallawtobefreeoftheimposedorderofothers,includingHobbes’leviathan.
AsdidHobbes,Lockealsoappealedtohumanreasontojustifyhisposition.Lockeproposedthattheexerciseofreasonledmenandwomentounderstandthatthestateofnaturewascivilized,andthatnaturewasnotanarchicandmurderousasHobbesproposed.Throughtheirabilitiestoreason,menandwomenwouldunderstandthatthelivesandpropertyofothersshouldberespected.Peoplewouldnaturallyunderstandthatiftheyfailedtorespectthelifeandpropertyofothers,theycouldnotexpectotherstorespecttheirownlivesandproperty.Lockethusproposedthattheinefficientoutcomeoftheprisoners’dilemmaofanarchywouldbeavoidedbymutualconsentbasedonreason,although,likeHobbes,hedidnotformallysetouttheprisoners’dilemma.
ForLocke,thenaturalrightofamanandawomantofreedomsupersededtheauthorityofanygovernment.Governmentwasthecreationofthepeopleandgovernmentshouldbethereforesubservienttothepeople,andnottheotherwayround.Theauthorityofgovernmentthereforerestsinthepeople.Lockedeclaredthat:
“nogovernmentcanhavearighttoobediencefromapeoplethathavenotfreelyconsentedtoit”(II,paragraph192).Politicaldecisionmakersarethereforeaccountabletothepeople,andthepeoplecanremoveandchangetheirpoliticaldecisionmakersatwill,shouldthepoliticians“besofoolish,orsowicked,astolayandcarryondecisionsagainstthelibertiesandthepropertiesofthesubject.”
Achoicebetweenorderandfreedom
HobbesandLockehaddifferentobjectivesinsettingouttheirviewsofgovernment.Hobbesviewedsocietyaspositionedonascalefromanarchytoorder.Anarchywasundesirableandauthoritariangovernmentwouldbringorder.Lockelookedatsocietyonascalefromindividualfreedomtorepression.Theobjectivewasfreedom.Theauthorityofgovernmentwasthereforesubjugatedtothenaturalrightoffreedomoftheindividual,andultimateauthorityrestedwiththeindividual,notwithgovernment.
Lockeiscorrectifpeoplecooperatespontaneouslybynaturalreasontoescapetheprisoners’dilemma.Hobbesiscorrectifpeopledonotcooperatevoluntarily,andcannotescapeanarchywithoutgovernment.Ifabroadbasisfortrustandcooperationcanbeestablishedinasociety,wehavethemeansofsubstantiatingLocke’spositionthatcollectivelyrationaloutcomescanbeattainedthroughindividualreasonwithoutthecoercionofgovernment.
2.Cooperationwithoutgovernment
ThebackgroundforthecontrastingpositionsofHobbesandLockeistheanarchythatweconsideredinchapter1.Wesawthataprisoners’dilemmacanariseunderconditionsofanarchy,andthatindividualrationalitydoesnotsolvetheprisoners’dilemma,butonthecontrarygivesrisetothedilemma.
Thecircumstancesoftheprisoners’dilemmaarisesextendbeyondanarchy.Wehaveseenthattheprisoners’dilemmaisinvolvedinvoluntaryfinancingofpublicgoods.Becausemanyormostexternalitieshaveapublicgoodnature,theprisoners’dilemmaisalsoinvolvedinthevoluntaryresolutionofexternalities.Voluntaryincomeredistributionalsohasapublicgooddimensionthatinvolvestheprisoners’dilemma.Theproblemfacingprinciplespoliticalcandidateswhowanttowinelectionsanddonotwanttotakemoneyfromspecialinterestsisalsoacaseoftheprisoners’dilemma.
Voluntarycooperationundertheconditionsoftheprisoners’dilemmawouldthereforeresolveproblemsofanarchy,publicgoods,externalities,socialjustice,andpoliticaldeviationsfromthepublicinterest.Thereareanumberofapproachestoseekingvoluntarycooperationtosolvetheprisoners’dilemma.
Crediblecommitment
Voluntarycooperationcanbeachievedintheprisoners’dilemmaifpeoplecanmakeacrediblecommitmenttocooperate.Apromisetocooperatecanbemadecrediblebyintroducinganadditionalbenefitorcostthatmakescooperationthepersonallybestchoice.Anexampleofsuchanadditionallyimposedbenefitorcostisapenaltyfornotcooperatingimposedbygovernment.Now,however,wearenotlookingtogovernmenttoenforcecooperativebehavior.Wearelookingforvoluntarycooperationwithoutgovernment.
Acrediblecommitmenttocooperatecantaketheformofeachindividualdepositingasumofmoneywithanoutsideparty.Anypersonwhosubsequentlyfailstokeepthepromisetocooperatelosesthedeposit.Themoneydepositedwiththeoutsidepartyneeds,ofcourse,tobegreaterthegainfromnotcooperating.Informertimes,cooperativeoutcomesweresustainedalongtheselinesbyexchangeofhostagesorbystrategicmarriages.Thehostageswereingeneralneverharmed.Thepurposeofthehostageswastointroducethepotentialforloss,soastochangeincentivestomakecooperationindividuallyrationalbehavior.
“Exchangeofhostages”ortheholdingofmoneybyoutsidepartiesisnotapracticalmeansofenforcingvoluntarycooperationamongindividualsinamodernsociety.Socialinteractionsaretooanonymoustoberesolvedbythesetypesofschemes.Toomanypeopleareinteractingwithtoomanyotherpeople.Everypersoninasocietywouldhavetofindawayofmakingacrediblecommitmenttocooperatewitheveryotherperson.The“outsideparty”requiredforthiscomplexarrangementissuggestiveofagovernment,andwearelookingforalternativestogovernment.
Repeatedencounters
Anotherapproachtoseekingvoluntarycooperationistorecognizethatthecircumstancesoftheprisoners’dilemmamayberecurringorrepeated.Weobservedinchapter1that,wheninteractionsarecontinuouslyrepeatedovertime,cooperationcanbeindividuallyrationalbehavior.Considerforexampletwopeoplewhoeverydayareobligedtomakeadecisionwhethertomakepersonalcontributionstofinancesupplyofapublicgood.Inthisrepeatedgame,theprisoners’dilemmagameisplayedoverandoveragain.Letusaddthefollowingconditionstotheinteractionbetweenthetwopersons:
(1)Theinteractionisindefinitelyrepeatedintothefuture.
(2)Individualsdonotdiscountthefuturetoomuch;thatis,thefutureisrelativelyimportantforbothpersons.
(3)Theidentityofthepersonswhoareinvolvedintheinteractionwillforeverremaint
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