《全球金融稳定报告》概要原文及翻译.docx
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《全球金融稳定报告》概要原文及翻译.docx
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《全球金融稳定报告》概要原文及翻译
附录
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Theglobalfinancialsystemremainsunderseverestressasthecrisisbroadenstoincludehouseholds,corporations,andthebankingsectorsinbothadvancedandemergingmarketcountries.Shrinkingeconomicactivityhasputfurtherpressureonbanks’balancesheetsasassetvaluescontinuetodegrade,threateningtheircapitaladequacyandfurtherdiscouragingfreshlending.Thus,creditgrowthisslowing,andeventurningnegative,addingevenmoredownwardpressureoneconomicactivity.Substantialprivatesectoradjustmentandpublicsupportpackagesarealreadybeingimplementedandarecontributingtosomeearlysignsofstabilization.Evenso,furtherdecisiveandeffectivepolicyactionsandinternationalcoordinationareneededtosustainthisimprovement,torestorepublicconfidenceinfinancialinstitutions,andtonormalizeconditionsinmarkets.Thekeychallengeistobreakthedownwardspiralbetweenthefinancialsystemandtheglobaleconomy.Promisingeffortsarealreadyunderwayfortheredesignoftheglobalfinancialsystemthatshouldprovideamorestableandresilientplatformforsustainedeconomicgrowth.
Tomendthefinancialsector,policiesareneededtoremovestrainsinfundingmarketsforbanksandcorporates,repairbankbalancesheets,restorecross-bordercapitalflows(particularlytoemergingmarketcountries);andlimittheunintendedsideeffectsofthepoliciesbeingimplementedtocombatthecrisis.Alltheseobjectiveswillrequirestrongpoliticalcommitmentunderdifficultcircumstancesandfurtherenhancementofinternationalcooperation.Suchinternationalcommitmentanddeterminationtoaddressthechallengesposedbythecrisisaregrowing,asdisplayedbytheoutcomeoftheG-20summitinearlyApril.
Awiderangeofnonbankfinancialinstitutionshascomeunderstrainduringthecrisisasassetpriceshavefallen.Pensionfundshavebeenhithard—theirassetshaverapidlydeclinedinvaluewhilethelowergovernmentbondyieldsthatmanyusetodiscounttheirliabilitieshavesimultaneouslyexpandedtheirdegreeofunderfunding.Lifeinsurancecompanieshavesufferedlossesonequityandcorporatebondholdings,insomecasessignificantlydepletingtheirregulatorycapitalsurpluses.Whileperhapsmostoftheseinstitutionsmanagedtheirrisksprudently,sometookonmoreriskwithoutfullyappreciatingthatpotentialstressfulepisodesmaylieahead.
Theretrenchmentfromforeignmarketsisnowoutpacingtheoveralldeleveragingprocess,withasharpdeclineofcross-borderfundingintensifyingthecrisisinseveralemergingmarketcountries.Indeed,thewithdrawalofforeigninvestorsandbankstogetherwiththecollapseinexportmarketscreatefundingpressuresinemergingmarketeconomiesthatrequireurgentattention.Therefinancingneedsofemergingmarketsarelarge,estimatedatsome$1.6trillionin2009,withthebulkcomingfromcorporates,includingfinancialinstitutions.Thoughnotoriouslydifficulttoforecast,currentestimatesarethatnetprivatecapitalflowstoemergingmarketswillbenegativein2009,andthatinflowsarenotlikelytoreturntotheirpre-crisislevelsinthefuture.Already,emergingmarketeconomiesthathavereliedonsuchflowsareweakening,increasingtheimportanceofcompensatoryofficialsupport.
Despiteunprecedentedofficialinitiativestostopthedownwardspiralinadvancedeconomies—includingmassiveamountsoffiscalsupportandanarrayofliquidityfacilities—furtherdeterminedpolicyactionwillberequiredtohelprestoreconfidenceandtorelievethefinancialmarketsoftheuncertaintiesthatareunderminingtheprospectsforaneconomicrecovery.However,thetransferoffinancialrisksfromtheprivatetothepublicsectorposeschallenges.Therearecontinuingconcernsaboutunintendeddistortionsandwhethertheshort-termstimuluscosts,includingopen-endedbanksupportpackages,willcombinewithlonger-termpressuresfromagingpopulationstoputstrongupwardpressureongovernmentdebtburdensinsomeadvancedeconomies.Homebiasisalsosettinginasofficialsareencouragingbankstolendlocallyandconsumerstokeeptheirspendingdomesticallyoriented.
Theserisks,discussedinChapter1,representsomeofthemostdifficultissuesthatthepublicsectorhasfacedinhalfacentury.Weoutlinebelowwhatwebelievearethekeyelementstobreakthedownwardspiralbetweenthefinancialsectorandtherealeconomy.
ImmediatePolicyRecommendations
Evenifpolicyactionsaretakenexpeditiouslyandimplementedasintended,thedeleveragingprocesswillbeslowandpainful,withtheeconomicrecoverylikelytobeprotracted.TheaccompanyingdeleveragingandeconomiccontractionareestimatedtocausecreditgrowthintheUnitedStates,UnitedKingdom,andeuroareatocontractandeventurnnegativeintheneartermandonlyrecoverafteranumberofyears.
Thisdifficultoutlookarguesforassertiveimplementationofalready-establishedpoliciesandmoredecisiveactiononthepolicyfrontwhereneeded.Thepoliticalsupportforsuchaction,however,iswaningasthepublicisbecomingdisillusionedbywhatitperceivesasabusesoftaxpayerfundsinsomeheadlinecases.Thereisarealriskthatgovernmentswillbereluctanttoallocateenoughresourcestosolvetheproblem.Moreover,uncertaintyaboutpoliticalreactionsmayunderminethelikelihoodthattheprivatesectorwillconstructivelyengageinfindingorderlysolutionstofinancialstress.Hence,animportantcomponenttorestoringconfidencewillbeclarity,consistency,andthereliabilityofpolicyresponses.Pastepisodesoffinancialcrisishaveshownthatrestoringthebankingsystemtonormaloperationtakesseveralyears,andthatrecessionstendtobedeeperandlongerlastingwhenassociatedwithafinancialcrisis(seeChapter3oftheApril2009WorldEconomicOutlook).Thissameexperienceshowsthatwhenpoliciesareunclearandnotimplementedforcefullyandpromptly,orarenotaimedattheunderlyingproblem,therecoveryprocessisevenmoredelayedandthecosts,bothintermsoftaxpayermoneyandeconomicactivity,areevengreater.
Giventheglobalreachofthiscrisis,theeffectofnationalpoliciescanbestrengthenedifimplementedinacoordinatedfashionamongaffectedcountries.CoordinationandcollaborationshouldbuilduponthepositivemomentumcreatedbytherecentG-20summit,andisparticularlyimportantwithrespecttofinancialpoliciestoavoidadverseinternationalspilloversfromnationalactions.Specifically,cross-bordercoordinationthatresultsinamoreconsistentapproachtoaddressbankingsystemproblems,includingdealingwithbadassets,ismorelikelytobuildconfidenceandavoidregulatoryarbitrageandcompetitivedistortions.
Intheshortrun,thethreeprioritiesidentifiedinpreviousGFSRsandexplicitlyrecognizedintheFebruary2009G-7Communiquéremainappropriate:
(i)ensurethatthebankingsystemhasaccesstoliquidity;(ii)identifyanddealwithimpairedassets;and(iii)recapitalizeweakbutviableinstitutionsandpromptlyresolvenonviablebanks.Ingeneral,thefirsttaskisforcentralbanks,whilethelattertwoaretheresponsibilityofsupervisorsandgovernments.Progresshasbeenmadeinthefirstarea,butpolicyinitiativesintheothertwoareasappeartobemorepiecemealandreactivetocircumstances.Recentannouncementsbyauthoritiesinvariouscountriesrecognizetheneedtodealwithproblemassetsandtoassessbanks’resiliencetothefurtherdeterioratingglobaleconomyinordertodeterminerecapitalizationneeds.Thesearewelcomestepsandasdetailsbecomeavailablewilllikelyhelpreduceuncertaintyandpublicskepticism.Lessonsfrompastcrisessuggesttheneedformoreforcefulandeffectivemeasuresbytheauthoritiestoaddressandresolveweaknessesinthefinancialsector.
Assurethatemergingmarketeconomieshaveadequateprotectionagainstthedeleveragingandriskaversionofadvancedeconomyinvestors.
Theproblemsoftheadvancedcountrybankingsectorsandtheglobalcontractionarenowhavingsevereeffectsonemergingmarketcountries.Weprojectannualcross-borderportfoliooutflowsofaround1percentofemergingmarketGDPoverthenextfewyears.Underreasonablescenarios,privatecapitalflowstoemergingmarketscouldseenetoutflowsin2009,withslimchancesofarecoveryin2010and2011.
Asinadvancedeconomies,emergingmarketcentralbankswillneedtoassureadequateliquidityintheirbankingsystems.However,inmanycasesthedomesticinterbankmarketisnotamajorsourceoffunding,asmuchbankfundinghasbeensourcedexternallyinrecentyears.Thus,centralbanksmaywellneedtoprovideforeigncurrencythoughswapsoroutrightsales.Thosecentralbankswithlargeforeignexchangereservescandrawonthisbuffer,butothermeans,suchasswaplineswithadvancedcountrycentralbanksortheuseofIMFfacilities,shouldalsobealineofdefense.ThegreaterresourcesavailabletotheIMFfollowingtheG-20summitcanhelpcountriesbuffertheimpactofthefinancialcrisisonrealactivityand,particularlyinthedevelopingcountries,limittheeffectonthepoor.Moreover,IMFprogramscanplayausefulroleincatalyzingsupportfromothersinsomecases.
Coordinatepoliciesacrosscountriestoavoidbeggar-thy-neighbortreatment.
*Pressuretosupportdomesticlendingmayleadtofinancialprotectionism.Whencountriesactunilaterallytosupporttheirownfinancialsystems,theremaybeadverseconsequencesforothercountries.Inanumberofcountries,authoritieshavestatedthatbanksreceivingsupportshouldmaintain(orpreferablyexpand)theirdomesticlending.Thiscouldcrowdoutforeignlendingasbanksface
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