巴菲特致股东的信度.docx
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巴菲特致股东的信度.docx
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巴菲特致股东的信度
巴菲特致股东的信2010年度
伯克希尔2010年度报告
TotheShareholdersofBerkshireHathawayInc.:
Theper-sharebookvalueofbothourClassAandClassBstockincreasedby13%in2010.Overthe
last46years(thatis,sincepresentmanagementtookover),bookvaluehasgrownfrom$19to$95,453,arateof
20.2%compoundedannually.*
Thehighlightof2010wasouracquisitionofBurlingtonNorthernSantaFe,apurchasethat’sworking
outevenbetterthanIexpected.ItnowappearsthatowningthisrailroadwillincreaseBerkshire’s“normal”
earningpowerbynearly40%pre-taxandbywellover30%after-tax.Makingthispurchaseincreasedourshare
countby6%andused$22billionofcash.Sincewe’vequicklyreplenishedthecash,theeconomicsofthis
transactionhaveturnedoutverywell.
A“normalyear,”ofcourse,isnotsomethingthateitherCharlieMunger,ViceChairmanofBerkshire
andmypartner,orIcandefinewithanythinglikeprecision.Butforthepurposeofestimatingourcurrentearning
power,weareenvisioningayearfreeofamega-catastropheininsuranceandpossessingageneralbusiness
climatesomewhatbetterthanthatof2010butweakerthanthatof2005or2006.Usingtheseassumptions,and
severalothersthatIwillexplaininthe“Investment”section,Icanestimatethatthenormalearningpowerofthe
assetswecurrentlyownisabout$17billionpre-taxand$12billionafter-tax,excludinganycapitalgainsor
losses.EverydayCharlieandIthinkabouthowwecanbuildonthisbase.
BothofusareenthusiasticaboutBNSF’sfuturebecauserailroadshavemajorcostandenvironmental
advantagesovertrucking,theirmaincompetitor.LastyearBNSFmovedeachtonoffreightitcarriedarecord
500milesonasinglegallonofdieselfuel.That’sthreetimesmorefuel-efficientthantruckingis,whichmeans
ourrailroadownsanimportantadvantageinoperatingcosts.Concurrently,ourcountrygainsbecauseofreduced
greenhouseemissionsandamuchsmallerneedforimportedoil.Whentraffictravelsbyrail,societybenefits.
Overtime,themovementofgoodsintheUnitedStateswillincrease,andBNSFshouldgetitsfull
shareofthegain.Therailroadwillneedtoinvestmassivelytobringaboutthisgrowth,butnooneisbetter
situatedthanBerkshiretosupplythefundsrequired.Howeverslowtheeconomy,orchaoticthemarkets,our
checkswillclear.
Lastyear–inthefaceofwidespreadpessimismaboutoureconomy–wedemonstratedourenthusiasm
forcapitalinvestmentatBerkshirebyspending$6billiononpropertyandequipment.Ofthisamount,
$5.4billion–or90%ofthetotal–wasspentintheUnitedStates.Certainlyourbusinesseswillexpandabroadin
thefuture,butanoverwhelmingpartoftheirfutureinvestmentswillbeathome.In2011,wewillsetanew
recordforcapitalspending–$8billion–andspendallofthe$2billionincreaseintheUnitedStates.
Moneywillalwaysflowtowardopportunity,andthereisanabundanceofthatinAmerica.
Commentatorstodayoftentalkof“greatuncertainty.”Butthinkback,forexample,toDecember6,
1941,October18,1987andSeptember10,2001.Nomatterhowserenetodaymaybe,tomorrowisalways
uncertain.
*Allper-sharefiguresusedinthisreportapplytoBerkshire’sAshares.FiguresfortheBsharesare
1/1500thofthoseshownforA.
3
Don’tletthatrealityspookyou.Throughoutmylifetime,politiciansandpunditshaveconstantly
moanedaboutterrifyingproblemsfacingAmerica.Yetourcitizensnowliveanastonishingsixtimesbetterthan
whenIwasborn.Theprophetsofdoomhaveoverlookedtheall-importantfactorthatiscertain:
Humanpotential
isfarfromexhausted,andtheAmericansystemforunleashingthatpotential–asystemthathasworkedwonders
forovertwocenturiesdespitefrequentinterruptionsforrecessionsandevenaCivilWar–remainsaliveand
effective.
Wearenotnativelysmarterthanwewerewhenourcountrywasfoundednordoweworkharder.But
lookaroundyouandseeaworldbeyondthedreamsofanycolonialcitizen.Now,asin1776,1861,1932and
1941,America’sbestdayslieahead.
Performance
CharlieandIbelievethatthoseentrustedwithhandlingthefundsofothersshouldestablish
performancegoalsattheonsetoftheirstewardship.Lackingsuchstandards,managementsaretemptedtoshoot
thearrowofperformanceandthenpaintthebull’s-eyearoundwhereveritlands.
InBerkshire’scase,welongagotoldyouthatourjobistoincreaseper-shareintrinsicvalueatarate
greaterthantheincrease(includingdividends)oftheS&P500.Insomeyearswesucceed;inotherswefail.But,
ifweareunableovertimetoreachthatgoal,wehavedonenothingforourinvestors,whobythemselvescould
haverealizedanequalorbetterresultbyowninganindexfund.
Thechallenge,ofcourse,isthecalculationofintrinsicvalue.PresentthattasktoCharlieandme
separately,andyouwillgettwodifferentanswers.Precisionjustisn’tpossible.
Toeliminatesubjectivity,wethereforeuseanunderstatedproxyforintrinsic-value–bookvalue–
whenmeasuringourperformance.Tobesure,someofourbusinessesareworthfarmorethantheircarrying
valueonourbooks.(Laterinthisreport,we’llpresentacasestudy.)Butsincethatpremiumseldomswings
wildlyfromyeartoyear,bookvaluecanserveasareasonabledevicefortrackinghowwearedoing.
Thetableonpage2showsour46-yearrecordagainsttheS&P,aperformancequitegoodintheearlier
yearsandnowonlysatisfactory.Thebountifulyears,wewanttoemphasize,willneverreturn.Thehugesumsof
capitalwecurrentlymanageeliminateanychanceofexceptionalperformance.Wewillstrive,however,for
better-than-averageresultsandfeelitfairforyoutoholdustothatstandard.
Yearlyfigures,itshouldbenoted,areneithertobeignorednorviewedasall-important.Thepaceof
theearth’smovementaroundthesunisnotsynchronizedwiththetimerequiredforeitherinvestmentideasor
operatingdecisionstobearfruit.AtGEICO,forexample,weenthusiasticallyspent$900millionlastyearon
advertisingtoobtainpolicyholderswhodeliverusnoimmediateprofits.Ifwecouldspendtwicethatamount
productively,wewouldhappilydosothoughshort-termresultswouldbefurtherpenalized.Manylarge
investmentsatourrailroadandutilityoperationsarealsomadewithaneyetopayoffswelldowntheroad.
Toprovideyoualonger-termperspectiveonperformance,wepresentonthefacingpagetheyearly
figuresfrompage2recastintoaseriesoffive-yearperiods.Overall,thereare42oftheseperiods,andtheytell
aninterestingstory.Onacomparativebasis,ourbestyearsendedintheearly1980s.Themarket’sgoldenperiod,
however,cameinthe17followingyears,withBerkshireachievingstellarabsolutereturnsevenasourrelative
advantagenarrowed.
After1999,themarketstalled(orhaveyoualreadynoticedthat?
).Consequently,thesatisfactory
performancerelativetotheS&PthatBerkshirehasachievedsincethenhasdeliveredonlymoderateabsolute
results.
Lookingforward,wehopetoaverageseveralpointsbetterthantheS&P–thoughthatresultis,of
course,farfromasurething.Ifwesucceedinthataim,wewillalmostcertainlyproducebetterrelativeresultsin
badyearsforthestockmarketandsufferpoorerresultsinstrongmarkets.
4
Berkshire’sCorporatePerformancevs.theS&P500byFive-YearPeriods
AnnualPercentageChange
Five-YearPeriod
inPer-Share
BookValueof
Berkshire
(1)
inS&P500
withDividends
Included
(2)
Relative
Results
(1)-
(2)
1965-1969...............................................17.25.012.2
1966-1970...............................................14.73.910.8
1967-1971...............................................13.99.24.7
1968-1972...............................................16.87.59.3
1969-1973...............................................17.72.015.7
1970-1974...............................................15.0(2.4)17.4
1971-1975...............................................13.93.210.7
1972-1976...............................................20.84.915.9
1973-1977...............................................23.4(0.2)23.6
1974-1978...............................................24.44.320.1
1975-1979...............................................30.114.715.4
1976-1980...............................................33.413.919.5
1977-1981...............................................29.08.120.9
1978-1982...............................................29.914.115.8
1979-1983...............................................31.617.314.3
1980-1984...............................................27.014.812.2
1981-1985...............................................32.614.618.0
1982-1986............................
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