审计师的独立性行为和道德外文文献文档格式.docx
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审计师的独立性行为和道德外文文献文档格式.docx
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Abstract
Ourpaperpresentstheresultsobtainedinalaboratoryenvironmentinwhichsubjectsrevealedtheirbeliefsaboutanuncertainstateoftheworldandthenparticipatedinasimpletaskwhichrequiredthemtoreportonwhetherthereportofasecondpartyisconsistentwiththesubjects’beliefs.Becausemaintainingpriorjudgements(auditindependence)whichwereindisagreementwiththesecondparty’sdecision(apotentialforaqualifiedauditopinion)werecostlytothesubject,asituationwascreatedinwhichthesubjectmightcompromiseherbeliefsataprice.Theresultssuggestthatamoral,self-interestedprofit-maximizingbehaviordoesnotgenerallycharacterizethesubjectsinthisexperiment.Furthermore,subjectscompromisetheirbeliefslessoften,i.e.,breachindependence,thehighertheirscoresonaDefiningIssuesTest,butmoreoften,thegreaterthecostofadheringtotheirbeliefs.
1.Introduction
Therequirementofauditorindependencearisesfromtheneedtoestablishtheindependentauditorasanobjectiveandtrustworthyarbiterofthefairpresentationoffinancialresults.Indeed,
MautzandSharaf(1961,pp.204–231)and
Berryman(1974,p.1)positthatindependenceisthecornerstoneoftheauditprofessionandanessentialingredientofusers’confidenceinfinancialstatements.Sinceindependentauditorsoccupyapositionoftrustbetweenthemanagementofthereportingentityandusersofitsfinancialstatements,theymustbeperceivedtobeoperatingindependentlyonthebasisofsoundauditingstandardsandstrongethicalprinciples.
Examinationsoftheindependenceissueoverthelastthreedecades,suchasthe
UnitedStatesSenateetal.,1976,
UnitedStatesSenate(MossCommittee),1978
and
TheCommissiononAuditors’Responsibilities(CohenCommission),1978,and
Treadway(1987)
Commissionsandthe
AdvisoryPanelonAuditorIndependence(1994)
haveallemphasizedtheimportanceofindependenceasacriticalfactorofprofessionalconduct.Moreover,theUSSupremeCourt,in
UnitedStatesv.ArthurYoung&
Co.etal.1984(1986,p.818),hasruledthattheindependentauditormust“maintaintotalindependencefromtheclientatalltimes”.
Codesofprofessionalconduct,suchasthoseoftheAmericanInstituteofCertifiedPublicAccountants(AICPA),theCanadianInstituteofCharteredAccountants,andtheInstituteofCharteredAccountantsofOntariorequirethatamember“inpublicpracticebeindependentinfactandinappearance…”
(PanyandWhittington,1994,p.94).1
Whereastheliteratureisrepletewithstudiesthatmodelauditors’decisionsofwhethertopreserveorcompromisetheirindependenceundervariouscircumstances
Antle,1984,DeAngelo,1981,
GoldmanandBarlev,1974,
KanodiaandMukherji,1994,
MageeandTseng,1990,Yoon,1990,
PennoandWatts,1991
Yost,1995,studiesthatattempttoobserveindependencedirectlyarequitesparse.2
Furthermore,researchwhichtriestolinkauditindependenceandethicalpropensityisrare
PonemonandGabhart,1990
WindsorandAshkanasy,1995.Wereportonactualobservations,obtainedviaacontrolledlaboratoryexperimentconcerningdecisionstocompromiseorpreserveindependenceinthecaseofclient–auditordisagreementsaboutareportingdecision.Outsidethiscontrolledenvironmenttheseinconsistentdecisionsorbreachesofindependenceareunobservableand,hence,theoriesabouttheiroccurrencearelargelyuntestableusingfielddata.Furthermore,wecombineandextendtwoimportantstreamsintheauditliterature:
(1)
Magee'
sandTseng'
s(1990)
andAntle'
s(1984)
analyticalmodellingofauditindependenceand
(2)
Ponemon'
sandGabhart'
andWindsor'
sandAshkanasy(1995)
empiricaltestsoftherelationbetweenmoraldevelopmentandauditorindependence.
Weassumethe
MageeandTseng(1990,pp.318–320)auditframeworkanddeviseanexperimentalaudittaskwhichfocusesonatestofwhethersubjectsexerciseindependentjudgementbasedontheirpriorbeliefs.Becauseourcontrolledlaboratoryenvironmentincludesexplicitmonetaryincentives(economicmotivation)bothaspositivepayoffsandnegativepenalties,wefeelthatthemethodallowsustomakeamoredirectevaluationofsubjects’behavioranditsrelationtotheirmoraldevelopmentthaneither
PonemonandGabhart(1990)
or
WindsorandAshkanasy(1995)
wereabletodousingtheirhypotheticalauditcaseexperiments.While
Ponemon(1993)
didattempttolinkaneconomicdecision(afreerider/Prisoner’sDilemmasituation)withmoraldevelopmentandethicaleducation,3
hisclassroomsettingdidnothavetheformalcontrolsavailableinthelaboratoryenvironment.Essentially,ourstudyusesaproxyvariableformoraldevelopmenttocontrolforthepotentialimpactofmoralchoiceonwhatislargelyatestofeconomicrationalityinanauditsetting.Ourresultsshowthat:
1.Astheprobabilityoflosingaclientbydisagreeingwiththeclient’sdecisionincreases,thefrequencyofindependenceviolationsincreases.Thisresultisindependentofwhethertheindependentauditors’behaviorismonitored.
2.Monitoringandpenalizingindependentauditors’behaviorreducethefrequencyofindependenceviolationswhentheprobabilityoflosingaclientissmall,butthefrequencyofviolationsisnotreducedwhentheprobabilityofthelossofaclientishigh.
3.Onaverage,subjectswithlowmoraldevelopmentscoresviolateindependencemorefrequentlythanthosewhohavehigherscores.
Theseresultssuggestthatwhileexternalreviewandpotentialpenalties(litigationcosts,lossofreputation,directfinesorlicencesuspension)mayreduceviolationsofauditorindependencesomewhat,thepositivereinforcementoftheattributemaycomefromincreasingindependentauditors’awarenessoftheethicaldimensionsoftheirdecisions.Usingadifferentresearchmethod,ourresultsalsovalidatePonemonandGabhart'
s(1990,pp.240–247)and
Windsor’sandAshkanasy’s(1995,pp.715–717)findingsonthesignificanceofmoraldevelopmenttoauditorindependence.
Thenextsectionprovidesareviewoftheresearchonethicsandauditing,includingadiscussionofthemoraldevelopmentliteraturefromdevelopmentalpsychologywhichisusedinthepresentstudy.Wethenprovideageneralframeworkforourstudy,describetheresearchdesignandhypotheses,anddiscusstheresultsoftheexperiment.Finally,wedrawconclusionsfromtheresultsandidentifyopportunitiesforextendingtheresearch.
2.Auditingandethicalbackground
Priorresearchonauditorindependencehaslargelyconcentratedeitheronmodellingtheindependentauditor’sjudgementoronsituationswhereauditorsmaybreachtheirrequiredindependence.Studiessuchas
DopuchandKing,1991
Schatzberg,1990
SchatzbergandSevcik(1994)
haveattemptedtostudytheconceptofindependenceinauditsettings,butdonotprovidedirectobservationsofsubjects’independenceasdoesthepresentstudy.4
Inthestudiescited,auditindependence(orlackthereof)isrevealedbyagreementordisagreementwithmanagement’sportrayalofafinancialreportingdilemmaofsomedescription.Whilethestudiesuseexperimentaltechniques,noneofthemattempttoassesstheindependentauditor’spriorbeliefsorexpectationsvisà
visthesituation.Suchanassessmentiscentraltoourpresentexperimentaltreatmentandformsthebasisofdeterminingwhetherasubjecthasbehavedindependentlyorhascompromisedpriorbeliefs.
Thesuggestionthatwhenexternalauditorsexerciseindependentjudgementaboutfinancialstatements,theyareengaginginwhatistantamounttoanethicalact,isnotanovelidea.CodesofethicssuchasthoseusedbytheAmericanInstituteofCertifiedPublicAccountantsandtheCanadianInstituteofCharteredAccountantsarenormallydesignedtomotivatemembersofprofessionalorganizationstooperateinanethicalmanner.Priorstudiessuggest,however,thattheunderlyingpsychologythatgovernsprofessionalbehaviorismorecomplicatedthansimplyhopingthatprofessionalsadheretotheorganization’scodeofconduct.Forexample,
LampeandFinn(1992,pp.34–55)comparedtheauditors’ethicaldecisionprocessmodeltheydevelopedtoanAICPACodedecisionmodelandconcluded(pp.55–56)thatthelatterisinsufficienttomotivateaccountantstopursueethicalbehavior.Similarly,
Ponemon(1988,
1990,
1992a,
b,
1993,
1995),
PonemonandGabhart(1993)
PonemonandGlazer(1990)utilizedtheoriesofcognitive-developmentalpsychology(describedbelow)toelucidatetheethicaldimensionsofaccountants’judgementproceduresandgenerallyconcludedthattheethicalcultureofthefirmanddomain-specificexperiencecoupledwithethicalreasoningaresignificantlyrelatedtoaccountants’ethicalbehavior.
Morespecifically,
PonemonandGabhart(1990,pp.240–247)and
WindsorandAshkanasy(1995,pp.709–714)haveestablishedthatthedegreeofmoraldevelopmenthelpstoexplainexternalauditors’independencebehavior.
Cushing(1990,p.254)expressedconcernabout
Ponemon’sandGabhart’s(1990)
chosenscenario(amanagementadvisorytaskofwhethertheindependentauditorsshouldhelptohireafinancialofficerforafirmforwhomtheyprovideauditservice)becauseitdidnotimplyexplicit,measurableeconomicconsequences.
WindsorandAshkanasy(1995,p.702)triedtoanswerCushing’scommentsbyconstructinganauditingcaseinvolvingamaterialitydilemmaaboutanerrorinanaccountingbalancetobereportedonthefinan
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